Aoun’s (Unplanned) Second War of Liberation?

Let’s quickly recall the political situation in Lebanon before the war, this war. Hariri was assassinated in February 2005. The international community led by the US and France and their allies in Lebanon suspected Syria to be involved in this assassination. This major incident mixed the political cards and drove new agreements between parties and broke others. The political arena was shaken and settled finally on two blocs.

The first bloc (sometime known as anti-Syrian. I prefer to call it pro-American) was the result of different political thoughts, united in their struggle against the Syrian presence. This bloc was lead by Hariri’s movement and the main druze leader Jumblatt. With the help of the Americans (and some like to say the French) they pushed Syria to pull out its troops from Lebanon as it was dictated in the UN resolution 1559.

The other bloc (known sometimes as pro-Syrian, but probably pro-resistance and anti-American are more accurate denominations), lead by Hezballah and Amal including various other smaller groups were against such pull out and especially against the way it occurred (strong American involvement applying its personal agenda and no recognition of the positive role Syria played during its presence in Lebanon).

A third entity, lead by Michel Aoun (the general and prime minister in 1989-1990 who first declared the liberation war against Syria in that same year) as he was returning from exile in France. He is considered to be the one who put the seeds that later lead to ousting the Syrians out of Lebanon. Since this pullout, he took a moderate stance against Syria. Surprisingly (not to him), he won the great majority of the Christian votes in the parliamentary elections. Nevertheless, the majority of the parliament was lead by the pro-American bloc (Hariri and co.).

The majority preferred to include the resistance in its government and exclude Michel Aoun who became the major pole of the opposition. Very soon, problems between the majority and the resistance started to erode the government. Simultaneously, Aoun and Nasrallah (Hazabllah’s leader) declared a joint agreement on the most complex political issues (including the role of the resistance and its agenda). This agreement was a major blow for the majority. Together Aoun and the anti-American bloc represented theoretically the new majority on the ground. The government obviously refused to call for new elections.

Very soon, as a result of depressive political divisions, the main political leaders started rounds of discussions as an attempt to bridge their differences. They were able with not much difficulty to agree on some easy to moderate questions (such as the international tribunal related to Hariri’s assassination, the control of Palestinian weapons outside the camps and the relations with Syria). Some progress was made on the Libanization of Shebaa farms and the need to delimit the borders around that area.

The discussions stalled on the resistance weapons issue. The last meeting was supposed to happen soon. This is where all started.

A crucial reality on the ground: the undeclared “alliance” of Aoun and the resistance was becoming much stronger (a lot of secular shiaa were adhering or supporting Aoun’s movement. In addition, Aoun and Nasrallah’s, called together for many protests, rallies and more). During the discussion on the disarmament, Aoun supported Nasrallah in his thesis of a need for a strong strategy to defend Lebanon against Israel’s potential aggressions. The pro-American bloc was not convinced of such needs and especially in the means of achieving them.

(Just as an anecdote, as we are talking about aggressions: in one of these meetings, Israel invited itself by allowing one of its fighter to break the sound barrier on top of Beirut.)

Now let’s summarize. Nasrallah backed by Aoun has a strong case. Israel’s aggressions in Lebanon are uncountable, Israel is controlling the Shebaa farms, is not accepting to release Lebanese prisoners, holds maps of mines in the South, has interests in Lebanese water and could at anytime attack Lebanon as it did in the past (the sound barrier broken is a good reminder of its bad intentions). Furthermore, together Aoun and Nasrallah represent with their allies more than 60% of the population.

Hence, if the discussions that were taking place succeeded, the only possible outcome is an agreement on an active role of the resistance in their fight against Israel, with a later solution to the weapons that resolve the resistance worries. If they don’t succeed then most probably, new elections would have been called on (otherwise, the country would have been jeopardized by massive protests). Such elections would probably allow the Aoun/Nasrallah alliance to take control of the country. This obviously would lead to an even stronger role of the resistance. In both cases, the resistance would have been, for the first time since the adoption of UN resolution 1559, (which calls for the disarmament of all militias operating in Lebanon), strengthened and officially backed by the government in place.

Such outcome would have represented a major blow for the US and obviously the worse case scenario for Israel. If we think again about these events, none of these would have been possible without Aoun (and his eventual agreement with Nasrallah). This explains the title of this article; it is certainly not to take any credit off the resistance in this battle against Israel, but it seems to me that things would have been very different and probably much worse internally if Aoun didn’t return and didn’t choose eventually to partner with Nasrallah.

The US, to my opinion, could not let this happen. After all, Lebanon was their small baby, their only (not anymore) achievement in the Middle East (whether we agreed with them or not). Lebanon’s success was on every speech the Bush administration made related to democracy and their war against terror. Having Nasrallah (even in the presence of Aoun) obtain a stronger support from the Lebanese government and eventually playing a more important role in Lebanon’s politics would not coincide with the US own vision of the Middle East (it is not about democracy-remember Hamas and the Palestinian elections). Israel can’t disagree with that.

You can imagine the scenario. A plan of war gets prepared; a military attack creates the perfect excuse. I guess you are currently following the rest in the news…

In 1989, Aoun’s (planned) liberation war against Syria, in a divided country, ended by a defeat. He got exiled and Syria and her allies controlled the country for the next decade and a half. Nevertheless, no one doubts that this war was the beginning of the end for the Syrian presence in Lebanon. Today’s one Billion dollars question is whether Aoun’s (unplanned) liberation war against Israel would have the same eventual outcome? Nothing is less sure with Israel/US if we are divided.

Now that this war was raged, would the Lebanese take their courage in both hands, rally behind their rights and keep resisting (on the grounds and politically) until these rights are achieved?

In the name of all the innocent babies that died, let it be a yes!